FONTAIN vs. iAVENEL.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1854.
WILLIAM FONTAf.N, APPELLANT, VS. WILLIAM BAVENEL.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
1. A testator devised as follows: "Forasmuch as there will be a surplus income
of my estate beyond what will be necessary to pay my said wife's annuity and
the other annuities, I do thdrefore direct my said executors to invest the said
surplus income and all accumulation of interest arising from that source yearly,
for and during all the term of the natural life of my said wife, * * * * and from
and immediately after the decease of my said wife, then all the rest, residue and
remainder of all my estate, ** * *
I*authorize and empowrer my executors,
or the survivor of them, after the decease of my said wife, to dispose of the same
for the use of such charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina as
they or he may deem most beneficial to mankind, and so that part of the colored
population in each of the said States of Pennsylvania and Solth Carolina shall
partake of the benefit thereof." All the executors of the will died before the testator's widow, and without having attempted to make an appointment under the
power conferred on them. Held, That the disposition of the residuary estate of
the testator, subject to the power of appointment of the executors, failed, and
that the heirs and next of kin of the testator were entitled to it.
2. No Court of Chancery, either in South Carolina or Pennsylvania, can administer
the fund in question,'and it remains unaffected by the bequest, because the means
through which it was to have been given and applied have failed.
3. In England, when the Chancellor directs the application of property which has
been the subject of an ineffectual charitable disposition, in accordance with the
will of the sovereign, indicated under the sign-manual, or when that officer him
self executes the cypres power in regard to such property, he does not act in the
discharge of his ordinary chancery powers.
4. No special trust is vested in the executors, by reason of this power of appointment. It is separable and distinct from their ordinary duties and trust as executors. It was to be exercised after the death of the wife of the testator; but the
executors died before her decease, and consequently they had no power to make
the appointment. The conditions annexed by the testator to the power rendered
the appointment impossible.
5. There must be some creative energy to give embodiment to an intention which
was never perfected. Nothing short of the prerogative power, it would seem, can
reach this case. There is not only uncertainty in the beneficiaries of this charity,
but there is a more formidable objection-there is no expressed will of the testator. He intended to speak through his executors, or the survivor of them, but by

FONTAIN vs. RAVENEL.

3831

the acts of Providence this has become impossible. It is then as though he had
not spoken,. and no power can now speak for him except that of theparenspat itv.
6. When there is nothing more than a power of appointment conferred by the testator, there is nothing on which a trust, on general principles, can be fastened.
Tle power given is a mere agency of the will, which may or may not be exercised
at-the discretion of the individual. And if there be no act on his part, the property never having passed out of the testator, it necessarily remains as part of
his estate. To meet such cases, a prerogative power, such as that of the king,
in England, must be invoked, which there, through the Chancellor, can give
effect to "thecharity.
7-. Some late decisions in England, involving charities, evince a disposition rather
to restrict than enlarge the powers exercised on this subject. An arbitrary rule
in regard to property, whether by a king, or chancellor, or both, leads to uncertainty and injustice.

Opinion of Mr. Chief JTustice TNY :1
I concur in the judgment of the court. But I do not for myself
desire to express an opinion upon either the law of Pennsylvania or
of South Carolina, in relation to charitable bequests. For assuming every thing to be true that is stated in the complainant's bill,
and that the bequest is valid by the laws' of Pennsylvania, and
would be carried into execution by the tribunals of the State, yet I
think the circuit court of the United States had not jurisdiction to
establish and enforce it-and was right, therdfore, in dismissing the
bill. I propose .to show very briefly the grounds on which this opinion is formed.
Undoubtedly a charitable bequest of this description would be
maintained in the English court of chancery. The death of the executors in the lifetime of the widow would make no difference. The
bequest would still be good against the heirs or representatives of
the testator, and the fund applied to charitable purposes according
to a scheme approved by the chancellor, or authorized under the
sign-manuel of the king.
But the power which the chancellor exercises over donations to
charitable uses, so far as it differs from the power he exercises in
other cases of trust, does not .belong to the court of chancery as a
court of equity, nor is it a part of its judicial power and jurisdiction.
'For the opinion of the Court, see ante, p. 264.
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It is a branch of the prerogative power of the king asparenspatric,
which be exercises by the chancellor..
Blackstone in his Commentaries, 3d vol. 47; enumerating what
he states tV be extraorWdinary powers 6f the chancellor, says: "He
is the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics, and- has
the general superintendence of all charitable uses in-the kingdom;
and all this over and above the vast and extensive jurisdiction which
he exercises in his judicial capacity in the court of chancery." And
in the same volume, page 437, he says: "The king as parenspatrim
has the general superintendence of all charities, which he exercises
by the keeper of his conscience, the chancellor; and, therefore, whenever it is necessary, the attorney general at the relation of some informant files an ex off cio information in the courtof chancery to
have the charity properly established."
So, too, Cooper, in his chapter on the jurisdiction of the court,
says: "Thejurisdiction, however, in the three cases of infants, idiots
or lunatics, and charities, does not belong to the court of chancery
as a court of equity, but as administering the prerogative and duties
of the Crown."
And in the case of the Baptist Association vs. Hart's Executors,
4 Wheat. 1, this court, after examining many English authorities
upon the subject, affirm the same doctrine. And Chief Justice
Marshal], who delivered the opinion of the court, expresses it in the
following strong and decisive language, (page 48.)
"It would be a waste of time (says the Chief Justice) to multiply
authorities to this point, because the principle is familiar to the profession. It is impossible to look into the subject without perceiving
and admitting it. Its extent may be less obvious.
"We now find (he continues) this prerogative *employed in enforcing donations to charitable uses, which would not be valid if made to
other uses; in applying them to different objects than those designated by the donor, and in supplying all defects in the instrument
by which the donation is conveyed, 'or in that by which it is
administered."
Resting my opinion upon the English authorities above referred
to, and upon the emphatic language just quoted from the decision
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of this court, I think I may safely conclude that the power exercised
by the English court of chancery "in enforcing donations to charitable uses, which would not be valid if made to other uses," is not
a part of its jlrisdiction as a court of equity, but a prerogative
power exercised by that court.
It remains to inquire whether the Constitution has conferred this
prerogative power on the courts of equity of the United States.
The 2d'section of the 3d article of the Constitution declares that
the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in
law and equity specified in the section. These words obviously
confer judicial power, and nothing more ; and cannot upon any fair
construction be held to embrace the prerogative powers, which the
king, as parens patrice in England, . exercised through the courts.
And the chancery jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,
as granted by the Constitution, extends only to cases over which
the court of chancery had jurisdiction in its judicial character as a
court of equity. The wide discretionary power which the chancellor
of. England exercises over infants, lunatics or idiots, or charities,
has not been conferred.
These prerogative powers, which belong to the sovereign asparens
patrice, remain with the States. They may legalize charitable bequests within their own respective dominions, to the extent to 'which
the law upon that subject has been carried in England; and they
may require any tribunal of the State, which they think proper to
select for that purpose, to establish such charities, and to carry
them into execution. But state laws will not authorize the courts
of the United States to exercise any power that is not in its nature
judicial; nor can they confer on them the prerogative powers over
minors, idiots and lunatics, or charities, which the English chancellor
possesses. Nobody will for a moment suppose that a court of equity
of the United States could, in virtue of a State law, take upon
itself the guardianship over all the minors, idiots or lunatics in the
State. Yet these powers in the English chancellor stand upon the
same ground, and are derived from the same authority, as its power
in cases of charitable bequests.
State laws cannot enlarge the powers of the courts of the United
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States beyond the limits marked out by the Constitution. It is
true that the courts of chancery of the United States, in administering the law of a State, may sometimes be called on to exercise
powers which do not belong to courts of equity in,
England. And,
in such cases, if the power is judicial in its character, and capable
of being regulated by the established rules and principles of a court
of equity, there can be no good objection, to its exercise. It falls
within the just interpretation of the grant in the Constitution.- But,
beyond this, the State laws can confer no jurisdiction on the courts
of equity of the United States.
In the cases in relation to charities which have come before this
court, there has been a good deal of discussion uipon the question,
whether the power of the chancery court .of England was derived
from the 43d of Elizabeth, or was exercised by.the court before
that act was passed. And there has been a diversity of opinion
upon this.subject in England, as well as in this c~untry. In the
case of the Baptist Association vs. Hart's -Executors, Chief Justice
Marshall, who delivered the opinion of the court, (vide 4 Wheat. 49,)
and Mr. Justice Story, who wrote out his own. opinion, and afterwards published it in the Appendix to 8 Pet. Rep., (vide p. 497,) were
both at that time of opinion that it was derived from the statute.
But in VFidal vs. Girard's _Execdtors, 2 How. 127, Mr. Justice
Story changed his opinion, chiefly upon the authority of cases found
in the old English records, which had been printed a short time before by the commisioners on public records in England. It appeared
from these records that the power had been exercised in many cases
long before the statute was passed.
But this circumstance does not affect the question I am now considering; for, whether exercised before or not, yet, whenever exercised, it was in virtue of the prerogative power, and not as a part of
the jurisdiction of the court as a court of equity. The statute- conferred no new prerogative on the Crown. And Lord Redesdale, (1st
Bligh. 847,) while he held that the power existed in the chancellor
before the statute, and had been frequently exercised, declares it to
be a prerogative power, and says: The King, as paren8 patrie,
has a rightby his proper officer, the attorney general, to call upon
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the several courts of justice, according to the nature of their several
jurisdictions, to see thak right is done to his subjects who are incompetent to act for themselves, as in the case of charities and other
cases.
Besides, if it could be shown that at some remote period of time
the court of chancery exercised this power as a part of its ordinary
jurisdiction as a'court of equity, it would not influence the construction of the words used in the Constitution. For at the time that
instrument was adopted, it was universally admitted by the jurists
in England and in this country, as will appear by the references
above made, this extraordinary and unregulated power in relation
to charities was not judicial, and did not belong to the court as a
court of equity. The Constitution of the United States, as I have
before said, grants only judicial power at law and in equity to its
courts; that is, the powers at that time understood and exercised as
judicial, in the courts of common law and equity in England. And
it must be construed according to the meaning which the words used
conveyed at the time of its adoption; and the grant of power cannot
be enlarged by resorting to a jurisdiction which the court of chancery in England, centuries ago,. may have claimed as a part of its
ordinary judicial power, but which had been abandoned and repudiated as untenable on that ground, by the court itself, long before
the Constitution was adopted.
Cases may arise in a circuit court of the United States, in which
it would be necessary to decide whether the English doctrine as to
charities was founded on the statute, or was a part of the law of
England before the statute was passed. And in a suit by an heir
or representative of the testator, authorized from his place of residence to sue in a court of the United Srates, to recover property or
money bequeathed to a charity, the court must of necessity examine
whether the bequest was valid or not by the laws of the State, and
barred by the claim of the heir or representative. And if in such a
case it appeared that the State had not adopted the statute, it would
be necessary to inquire whether the law in relation to these bequests
was a part of the common law before the statute, and administered
as such by the English court of chancery, and whether it had been
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adopted by the State as a part of its common-law. I or the prerogative powers of the English Crown ii relation to minors, idiots
or lunatics, and charities, are a part of the common law of England;
and the people of any State, who deemed it proper to do so, might
vest these powers in the courts of the State..
Such an inquiry was necessary in the case of Vidal vs. Girard's
Executors, and of Vheeler vs. Smith. But the question of jurisdiction is a very different one when a court of the United States is
called upon to execute the duties of the sovereignty of the State,
and to take upon itself the discretionary powers which, if they exist
at all by its common law or statutes, belong to the official representatives of the yarens patrite, that is, the State sovereignty. And
in the case of the Baptist Association vs. Hart, although the court
did not expressly deny its jurisdiction to establish the charity, if it
had beenvalid by the laws of Virginiao yet it expressed its doubts
upon the subject, saying that the question could only arise where
the attorney general was a party.
For these reasons a court of chancery of the United States must,
in my opinion, deal with bequests and trusts' for charity as they
deal with bequests aud trusts for other lawful purposes; and decide
them upon the same principles and by the same rules. And if the
object to be benefited is so indefinite and so vaguely described,
that the bequest could not be supported in the case of an ordinary
trust, it cannot be established in a court of the United States upon
the ground that it is a charity. And if from any cause the cestui
que trust, in an ordinary case of trust, would be incapable of maintaining a suit in equity to establish his claim, the same rule must be
applied where charity is the object, and the complainant claims to be
recognized as one of its beneficiaries.
I concur, therefore, in confirming the judgment of the Circuit Court,
dismissing the bill ; but I concur upon the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of the case stated by the complainant, and express no opinion as to the validity or invalidity of this bequest,
whether in this respect it be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania
or of South Carolina.

THE STEAM TUG SAMPSON.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, October, 1854.
THE STEAM TUG SAMPSON.

1

1. The Court confirming its decision in the case of Smith vs. The C eolc and Sampson,
(2 Wallace, Jr. 485,) applies more strongly the doctrines of that case; and holds
that when even small vessels, as coal heavers, are in tow, the towing boat is the
servant of the vessel towed, and that the Tug, being thus bound to obey the orders
of the other vessel, is not responsible, though in:point of fact giving orders to her,
for damages in the proper course of its employment.
:2.Though the rule of porting the helm is obligatory, when in ordinary cases, vessels meet in the same line, it is not one always to be observed when they are in
parallellines. Circumstances control the rule; and, when a boat is moving against
the tide,.slowly and with difficulty, (as when tugging a heavy vessel,) and is out
of the centre of the channel, which is left free to the other, the rule can have no
application.
.2. Steamers, especially large steamers, are held to the strictest care possible when.
in ports or in the neighborhood of sailing and smaller vessels; and must move
slowly and with extreme circumspection. And if from violation of this duty, small
or sailing vessels are put suddenly into confusion or jeopardy, the Court will not
inquire whether the rules applicable to ordinary cases of meeting, havebeen strictly
observed by the weaker vessel, or not; but will hold the steamer responsible, as
reckless, for all injury happening to or committed through the act of the weaker
.vessel, from mistake caused by the embarrassment natural to the condition into
which the steamer had put this weaker vessel.

A large steamer was coming, on a moonlight and pretty clear
night, up the Delaware and opposite the City of Philadelphia, at her

ordinary speed of 11 miles an hour; the tide being full in her favor,.
and she having come up the middle of the channel (here about 960,
feet wide,) that she might have the whole benefit of the current. A

small tow steam-tug, The Sampson, of 65 horse power, was towing,
at the same time, in an opposite direction, a heavily ladened coal.
schooner of 145 tons, which was attached to it by a hawser, 15 to 20

fathom long.

The tug aid schooner were working along at the

rate of 2. miles an hour, against the tide, and were hugging the
shore (being within 90 to 160 feet of it) of an island opposite the
city; as well that they might avoid the strength of the current

against them, as that they might be out of the way of ferry-boat.
'This case will be found in 8 Wallace, Jun., yet unpublished.
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emerging suddenly from the city docks, opposite. They could go no
nearer to the shore of the island with safety than they were. The
steamer being near her place of landing, ported her helm and sheered
towards the island for the purpose of rounding to at the city wharf.
She had not seen the tug: and the schooner-in consequence of her
spars being without sails, her motion being scarcely apparent, and
her position being close upon the island where vessels often anchor
to await a change of tide-was mistaken by the steamer for a vessel
at anchor. The tug seeing the movement of the steamer in rounding to, and clearly foreseeing a collision if she, herself, went on her
course, starboarded her helm t3 get still closer to the island. The
schooner who had been directed by the tug's pilot to follow in the
wake of the tug, did the same. The tug escaped, but the schooner
was brought directly into the line of the steamer and notwithstanding all the steamer's efforts at this moment, by porting her helm, to
get between the schooner and the island, a serious collision took
place. Had the schooner ported her helm, and cut the tow-line she
would probably have escaped.
Libels being filed by the steamer against the tug and schooner,
and by the schooner against the tug and steamer, the District Court
was of opinion, on this case, that the collision was directly attributable to the act of the tug in starboarding her helm and so taking
the schooner nearer to the island, instead of doing the reversed manceuvre, of porting, which would have taken both the tug and. her
tow out into the channel. The tug was accordingly condemned by
that Court to answer the damages which both steamer and schooner
had suffered.
The ease came now by the tug's appeal into this Court, where it
was argued by
-Mr. Serrill, for the schooner; by
Messrs. Ludlow and Cadwalader, for the steamer ; and by
.Nessrs aerhardand Williams, forthe tug.
After'argument the opinion was thus givei by '
J.-By the decision of this Court in the case of The Creole
2 Wallace, Jr. 485, the remedy ofi the steamboat is to be sought
GRIER,
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against the schooner, ahd not against the tug employed to tow her.
The tug was the servant of the schooner, and bound to obey the
orders of her master, and if the master choose to follow the directions of the pilot or steersman of the tug, and trust to his skill instead of his own, the acts of the pilot may be justly considered as
his own, and adopted by him. The remedy of the owner of the
steamboat (if entitled to any) is therefore against the schooner, and
not against its servant, the tug. Nor have we any evidence of any
disobedience of orders by the tug that should render it liable to the
schooner. For if the master of the schooner gave no directions to
the pilot or steersman of the tug, but submitted his own will to the
pilot's skill, he has adopted his acts and has no right to charge the
owners of the tug for his own negligence. The tug Sampson and
owners are therefore entitled to a decree in both cases.
Assuming the schooner to be liable for the acts of her servant,
the contest between her and the steamboat remains to be considered.
The tug and schooner were hugging the shore. It was, under
the circumstances, their proper place. When the tug saw the steamboat coming up the river, she was bound by no rule of navigation,
or common sense, to cross the channel to avoid a steamboat coming
up the middle of the river. She had left 800 of 960 feet of the
channel free to the steamboat. Knowing her own position at one
side of the channel, the tug could not anticipate the gross mistake
made by the steamboat with regard to her position, or that she
-would needlessly cross the channel, and run under the bows of the
tug and schooner. Both were carefully keeping out of harm's way,
when the steamer suddenly comes down upon them by sheering out
of her proper course, and the tug escapes destruction the best way
she can, in the sudden emergency produced by the mistake and
reckless haste of the steamboat. Whether the tug turned to the
right or left to save herself from destruction, is of no importance.
It was the mistake or carelessness of the steamboat to put her to
the necessity of turning either way. The rule of porting the helm
where vessels are meeting in a line, should invariably be observed;
but where vessels are in parallel lines, when one boat is working
against the tide, and with difficulty tugging a heavy vessel, keeps
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near the shore and leaves a free channel to the other who'is coming
up in the middle of it, the rule of porting the helm can have no
application.
If the tug had ported her helm on seeing the steamer, she would
have thrown her long tow obliquely across the middle of the channel, up which the steamboat was coming. The steamboat by turning out of her course to run under the bows of a vessel hugging the
shore, when a wide channel was left open before her wholly unobstructed, cannot now be heard to complain of the comparatively
helpless and slow-moving vessels for not exercising more skill in
getting out of her way. It was the duty of the steamboat moving
v,'ith great 1ower and momentum, with a tide in her favor, to keep
out of the way of small and slow vessels, one of which was helpless,
and fhe other slowly and painfully dragging behind her. The officer of the steamboat should have slackened her pace in order to
have time to ol)serve the difficulties of his position and to ascertain
the correct situation of vessels, whether moving or stationary in the
harbor. With her huge mass and great momentum the steamboat
cannot be allowed to dash, as a triton or leviathan among minnows,
into the midst of smaller vessels in a port, calling upon them to take
care and keep out of the way, or to learn at their cost the rule of
"Port your helm."
Every one knows the deception as to the relative position of bodies
to which those on board a vessel, moving into port after night are
subject. Moonlight may extend the range of vision, but it will
nevertheless subject the most sharp-sighted to great mistakes in a
port where some objects may be moving swiftly, others slowly, and
some at rest. The headway or momentum of a large steamboat,
moving at a velocity of ten or eleven miles an hour, cannot be so
suddenly checked, on the discovery of an error, as to hinder disastrous collisions, and there cannot be a better rule of navigation, than
that which will subject steamboats to all the damage occasioned by
such reckless conduct in a crowded and narrow port after night.
The steamboat must therefore bear its own injury, and must also
answer for the damage done to the schooner.
Decree reversed.
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In the Supreme Court of Ohio.
JOHN G. KERWHAKER VS. THE CLEVELAND, COLUMBUS,

AND CINCINNATI

RAILROAD COMPANY.'
I. There is no law in Ohio prohibiting the owners of domestic animals, consisting
of cattle, horses, hogs, &c., from permitting such animals to run at large
upon the range of unenclosed lands, except when unruly and dangerous; and
the rule of the common law of England, requiring the owner of such animals
to keep them on his own land, or within enclosures, has never been in force
in Ohio, being inapplicable to the circumstances, condition and usages of the
people, and also inconsistent with the legislation of the State.
1I. The owner of such animals, in allowing them to be at large on the range of
unenclosed lands, is not chargeable with an unlawful act, or an omission of
ordinary care in keeping his stock, doing nothing more than that which has
been customary, and by common consent, done by the people generally since
the first settlement of the State, subject to the qualification, however, that
animals which are unruly or dangerous, are required to be restrained.II. There is no law in this State requiring any person to fence or enclose his own
lands; yet the person who leaves his grounds unenclosed, takes the risk of
occasional intrusions thereon, by the animals of others running at large. And
the owner of such animals, in allowing them to be at large, takes the risk of
their loss, or of injury to them by unavoidable accident, from any danger into
which they may happen to wander.
IV. The right of a railroad company to the free, exclusive and unmolested use of
its railroad track, is nothing more than the right of every land proprietor, in
the actual use and occupancy of his lands; and does not exempt the Company from the duty enjoined by law upon every person, so to use his own
property as not to do any unnecessary injury to another.
V. There is no law in Ohio requiring railroad companies to fence their roads, but
when they leave their railroads open and unenclosed by sufficient fences and
cattle-guards, they take the risk of intrusions upon their roads by animals
running at large, as do other proprietors, who leave their lands unenclosed;
so that the owner of domestic animals, in allowing them to be at large, takes
the risk of their loss, or of injury to them by unavoidable accident; and the
company by leaving its road unprotected by an enclosure, runs the risk of
animals at large getting upon the road, without any remedy against the
owner of the animals.
VL The liability to make reparation for an injury by negligence, is founded upon
an original moral duty enjoined upon every person, so to conduct himself, or
exercise his own rights, as not to injure another.
I This recent decision on the right to reparation in damages for injuries to domestic animals by Railroad Companies in Ohio, is published at the request of a
number of members of the Western bar-Eds. Anm. L. Beg.
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VII. The mere fact that one person is in the wrong, does not necessarily discharge
another from the due observance of proper care towards him, or the duty of
so exercising his own rights, as not to do him any unnecessary injury.
VIII. The doctrine that, in the case of an injury by negligence, where the parties
are mutually in fault, the injured party is not entitled to redress, is subject
to the following material qualifications, as appears from a review of the decisions both in England and in this country, on the subject, to wit:
1. The injured party, although in the fault to some extent-at the time, may
notwithstanding this, be entitled to reparation in damages for an injury,
which he used ordinary care to avoid.
2. When the negligence of the defendant in a suit upon such ground of action, is the proximate cause of the injury, but that of the plaintiff only remote,
consisting of some act or omission, not occuring at the time of the injury, the
action is maintainable.
U. Where a party has in his custody or control, dangerous instruments, or
means of injury, and negligently places or leaves them in a situation unsafe
to others, and another person, although at the time even in the commission
of a trespass, or otherwise somewhat in the wrong, sustains an injury thereby, he may be entitled to redress.
4. And when the plaintiff in the ordinary exercise of his own rights, allows his
property to be in an exposed and hazardous position, and it becomes injured
by the neglect of ordinary care on the part of the defendant; he is entitled
to reparation on the ground that, although, in allowing his property to be
exposed to danger, he took upon himself the risk of loss or injury by mere accident, he did not thereby discharge the defendant from the duty f observing
ordinary care, or in other words, voluntarily incur the risk of injury by the
defendant's negligence.
IX. Iaving left its railroad unenlosed through a country where domestic animals
are allowed to be at large, and thus exposed to the casualties of the animals
-accidentally getting upon the railway track, it is the duty of the railroad
company, acting through its agents, to use at least ordinary and reasonable
care and diligence to avoid unnecessary injury to the animals, when found in
the way of a train on the road.
X. The first and paramount object of the attention of the agents of the company,
is due regard for the safety of the persons and property in their charge on the
train, for which they are held to a high degree of care, and so far as consistent with this paramount duty, they are bound to the exercise of what in that
peculiar business would be ordinary and reasonablecare to avoid unnecessary
injury to animals casually coming upon their unenclosed road ; and for any injury to animals arisingfrom a neglect of such care, the company is liable in damages to the owner.

Writ of Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Morrow County.
In the Court below, the plaintiff in error declared against the defendant, in trespass on the case, for the alledged negligence and
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misconduct of the defendant's agents in conducting and running a
locomotive and cars on the defendant's railway track, whereby six
hogs, the property of the plaintiff, were killed. The defendant
pleaded the general issue.
On the trial of the cause before a jury, it appeared that the defendant's railroad extending from Columbus to Cleveland, passed
through the farm 6f the plaintiff, on which he resided, in the county
of Morrow: that on the 17th of April, 1851, a train of cars, under
the management of defendant's agents, in passing upon said railroad
through the plaintiff's farm, run upon the plaintiff's hogs, which had
wandered off upon the railway track, and killed them. And evidence was offered on the part of the plaintiff, tending to prove, that
at the time the hogs were killed, the train was passing at the usual
and ordinary speed, and that from the situation of the railroad at
that locality, and the relative situation and locality of the hogs, and
the train of cars on the railroad, at the time of the occurence, the
defendant's agents in control of the train, could easily and readily
have so checked the speed of the cars, as to have permitted the
plaintiff's hogs to have escaped from the railroad track without injury: but that the agents of the defendant did not check the speed
of the train, but continued to run the same with unabated speed, by
reason whereof the hogs were unable to escape, and were killed.
And it appears, also, that evidence was offered on the part of the
defendant, tending to prove that at the time of the occurrence, the
agents of the defendant, did check the speed of the train, that the
usual signal was given to check up, before the cars ran over the
hogs-that the train was at the time running at its usual and
ordinary speed.
The testimony having been closed, the plaintiff's counsel asked
the court to charge the jury, that if they were satisfied from the
evidence, that the defendant's agents could by the exercise of ordinary care and caution, have so checked the speed of said train of
cars, as to have permitted the plaintiff's hogs to have escaped
without injury: but that the defendant's agents did not at all check
the speed of the train, or attempt so to do, but continued to run the
same at the usual and ordinary speed, by means whereof the plain-
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tiff's hogs were killed, the plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict for
the value of the hogs so killed. The court, however, refused to give
this in charge to the jury, but instructed the jury as follows:
1st. That the defendant had a right to have the track of its railroad free from obstructions, so that its trains might run thereon
with safety, subject to be crossed only on public highways and
regular private crossings, and that, therefore:
2d. If the jury found from the evidence that said hogs, of the plaintiff were killed while on the track of said railroad, and not while
crossing said railroad at such public or private crossing, that said
hogs were unlawfully upon said track, that said defendant was not
bound to check the ordinary and usual speed of said cars; and that
if said hogs were killed by defendant's train of cars, while in the
ordinary way passing along said track, said plaintiff had suffered
damage but not injury from the act of the defendant, and that the
defendant was not liable therefor.
To the charge thus given by the court below to the jury, and the
refusal to charge as requested, the plaintiff excepted, and took his
bill of exceptions, setting out the facts as above stated.
Under the instructions of the court below, the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant, on which judgment was rendered, to reverse which this writ of error is prosecuted.
S. . Mirkwood and B. Burns, Attorneys for plaintiff in error.
Finch &fOlds, and H. B. Carrington,Attorneys for defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
BARTLEY, J. -A maxim of the law, tested by the wisdom of centuries-exacts of every person in the enjoyment of his property, the
duty of so using his own as not to injure the property of his neighbor. It is in accordance with this principle, that it has been held,
that though a person do a lawful thing, yet, if any damage thereby
befalls another, which he could have avoided by reasonable and
proper care, he shall make reparation. Hence the general rule,
that in all cases where damage accrues to another, by the negligence
or improper conduct of a person in the exercise of his peculiar trade
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or business, an action is maintainable. Shields vs. Blackburne,
I H. Blacks. 158; Joore vs. Mourgue, Cowp. 480; Buller's
N. P. 78; Broom's Legal Maxims, 248.
How far this doctrine is applicable to railroad companies, in the
exercise of their peculiar business, is the question presented in the
case before us. The court below refused to charge the jury on request, that if they found from the evidence that the defendant's
agents could, in the use of ordinary care, have easily and safely
avoided the destruction of the plaintiff's property by checking the
speed of the train, the defendant would be liable: but on the contrary, instructed the jury, that as the hogs were improperly on the
railroad, the defendant's agents were not bound to check the ordinary and usual speed of the cars, or use any means or caution to
save the plaintiff's property.
The position taken by the court below, assuming the animals to
have been unlawfully on the railroad, would justify not only a wanton disregard of the plaintiff's property, but even an intentional
destruction of it, by defendant's agents, providing it occur while
running the train on the railroad in the ordinary way, and at the
usual speed.
Railroad Companies have become important and useful public
agents, affording vast facilities for trade and travel, and producing extensive results upon the social condition as well as the business of the
country; but while it is important that they should be fully protected
in the appropriate and legitimate exercise of their powers, it is just
that private individuals be secured from injury or invasion of their
rights, by the mode or manner in which railroad companies exercise
their peculiar functions. The obligation to make reparation for
damages done to another, by a person, in the improper manner in
which he exercises his own appropriate employment, often requires
great nicety of discrimination; and the application of this injunction to railroad companies in their peculiar business, so widely differing from that of other persons, must frequently become a matter of
no inconsiderable difficulty.
It is claimed on the part of the defence in this case;
1st. That it is the duty of the owner of domestic animals to keep
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them on his own lands, or within enclosures; and that if they wander from his own lands, and get upon the unenclosed lands of his
neighbors, they will be unlawfully there, and the owner guilty of
a trespass.
2d. That the plaintiff being in fault, and guilty of an unlawful act
in allowing his hogs to escape from his own lands, and get upon the
railroad, he cannot maintain an action for the value of the animals
killed by the defendant while in the prosecution of its lawful business, even although the agents of the company might have readily
and safely avoided injury to the animals, by the exercise of ordinary
care and prudence in the management of the train of cars.
The doctrine that the owner of cattle, hogs, horses, &c., is bound
to keep them on his own lands, or within an enclosure, and that he
becomes a wrong-doer if any of them escape or stray off upon the
lands of another person, although unenclosed, is said to be derived
from the common law of England, and to be in force in this State.
At an early period in this State the common law of England, and
the statutes of that country of a general nature in aid of the common law, passed prior to the fourth year of King James I, were
adopted by legislative enactment. But this act was repealed by the
General Assembly, on the 2d day of January, 1806, since which
time the common law of England has had no force in this State
derived from legislative adoption. But having been adopted in the
original States of the union, and introduced into Ohio at an early
period, the common law has continued to be recognized as the rule
of decision in our courts, in the absence of legislative enactments,
so far as its rules and principles appeared to be based on sound
reason, and applicable to our condition and circumstances. The
common law therefore, has no force in Ohio, except so far as it derives authority from judicial recognition in the practice and course
of adjudication in our courts; and this extends no further than it
explains and illustrates the rules of right and justice as applicable to the circumstances and institutions of the people of the State.
In the case of Sergent vs. Steinberger, 2 Ohio Rep. 805, the Supreme Court of this State held that the common law, so far as it relates to the subject of the estate by joint tenancy, would not be
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recognized in Ohio, upon the ground that the jus accrescendi was
not founded in principles of natural justice, nor in any reasons of
policy applicable to our state of society or institutions, but on the
contrary, was adverse to the understandings, habits, and feelings of
the people.
Admitting the rule of the common law of England in relation to
cattle and other live stock running at large, to be such as stated,
the question arises, whether it is applicable to the condition and
circumstances of the people of this State, and in accordance with
their habits, understandings, and necessities. If this be the law in
Ohio now, it has been so since the first settlement of the State, and
every person who has allowed his stock to run at large, and go upon
the unenclosed grounds of others, has been a wrong-doer, and liable
to an action for damages by every person on whose lands his creatures may have wandered. What has been the actual situation of
affairs, and the habits, understandings, and necessities of the people
of this State from its first settlement up to the present period, in this
respect? Cattle, hogs, and all other kinds of live stock, not known
to be breachy and unruly or dangerous, have been allowed, at all
times and in all parts of the State, to run at large and graze on the
range of uncultivated and unenclosed lands. And this prevails not
only throughout the country, but also in the villages and cities, except where it may be to a limited extent, restrained by local municipal ordinances. For many years in the early settled parts of the
State, the people were unable, and at the present time in some parts
of the State, they are yet unable to clear and enclose more ground
than that actually needed for cultivation. And there is not at this
time perhaps enclosed pasture lands sufficient to confine the one-half
of the live stock in the State. Even a statutory enactment imposing
the severest criminal punishment for permitting these animals to
be at large, could not be enforced without either slaughtering or
driving a large portion of them from the State. It has been the
habit of the people to enclose their grounds for the purpose of cultivation, and to fence against the animals running at large. And
it has been only within a few years, and that only in the better improved parts of the State, that uncultivated pasture grounds have
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been enclosed. And this has not been done, because the owners
considered themselves required by law to confine their stock within
enclosures, but for their own convenience and advantage. So that, it
has been the general custom of the people of this State, since its
first settlement, to allow their cattle, hogs, horses, &c., to be at
large, and range upon the unenclosed lands of the neighborhood in
which they are kept; and it has never been understood by them
that they were tors feasors, and liable in damages for letting their
stock thus run at large. The existence or enforcement of such a
law would have greatly retarded the settlement of the country, and
have been against the policy of both the General and the State government.
The common understanding upon which the people of this State
have acted, since its first settlement, has been, that the owner of
land was obliged to enclose it with a view to its cultivation; that
without a lawful fence he could not, as a general thing, maintain an
action for a trespass thereon by the cattle of his neighbor running
at large; and that to leave uncultivated lands unenclosed, was an
implied license to cattle, and other stock at large, toa traverse and
graze them. Not only, therefore, was this alledged rule of the
common law inapplicable to the circumstances and condition of the
people of this State, but inconsistent with the habits, the interests,
necessities and understanding of the people.
Besides this, the Legislature of the State has put at rest all
question as to the existence of any such rule in Ohio. The proviso
in the first section of the statute in relation to strays, recognizes
the fact of animals being allowed to run at large upon the range of
unenclosed lands, in the following language:
"Provided, that no person shall be allowed to take up any neat cattle, sheep or
hogs after the first day of April, and before the first day of November, annually:
nor shall any compensation or fees be allowed to anyperson for taking up any stray
animal from the range where such animal usually runs at large; c."-SwAX's REVISED
STATUTES, 883.

The statute regulating enclosures and providing against trespassing animals, (see Swan's Revised Statutes, 426,) fixes the requisites
of a lawful fence; and in the seventh section, provides the remedy,
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when the owner or occupant shall feel himself aggrieved by the
animals of another person, which run at large, breaking into his
enclosure. And the twelfth section of the same statute provides,
that when the fence-viewers shall ascertain any animals to be
habitually breachy and unruly, noticethereof shall be given to the
owner or keeper, who shall be required thereafter, under a penalty,
to restrain such animals from running at large, &c.
This legislation is wholly inconsistent with the doctrine, that it
is unlawful for the owner of animals to allow them to run at large,
and that he is liable in damages for a trespass, in case they go
upon the unencloscd grounds of another. Why the provision to
restrain breaehy and unruly animals from running at Large, if it
were the law of the State that the owner should allow none of his
stock to be at large, whether breachy or not? And why the provision for the assessment of damages for injury by trespassing aniinals, made to depend upon the contingency of a lawful fence ? If
the owner of trespassing animals were liable in damages, whether
the lands of the injured party were enclosed or not, the provision
making the assessment of damages to depend on the existence of a
lawful fence, would seem to be unnecessary, if not wholly absurd.
It was adjudged by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in the
case of Stadwell vs. Bitch, 14 Conn. Rep. 293, that the rule of
the English common law, making it the duty of the owner of cattle
to restrain them, and subjecting him to liability in damages for
suffering them to go upon the lands of another, whether enclosed
or not, does not prevail in that State, being inconsistent with the
situation of the country from the time of the first settlement of the
State, and also repugnant to the legislative enactments of the State
relating to that subject; on the contrary, it was held, that the owners
of lands were obliged to enclose them by a sufficient fence, before
they could maintain an action for a trespass done thereon by the
cattle of another. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge
Swift, (see Swift's Digest, 525,) and also recognized in the case of
Barnum vs. Vandusen, 16 Conn. Rep. 200.
It has been said, that in South Carolina a sufficient enclosure was
necessary to protect the planter against the inroads of horses, cattle
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and hogs, whose right to go at large in the range is derived from
the common law of South Carolina. Town of Beaufort vs. Danner,
1 Strobhart, 175.
It was held by the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, in the
case of Seely vs. Peters, 5 Gilman's Rep. 130, that the common
law, requiring the owner of cattle, hogs, &c., to keep them on his
own land, has never been in force in Illinois; that there is no
general law in that State prohibiting cattle from running at large;
and that in order to maintain an action for the trespass of cattle on
land, the owner of the land must have it surrounded by a sufficient
fence. The subject is carefully investigated in this case, and the
ground on which the decision is placed is, that the common law rule
is inapplicable to the circumstances and condition of the people, and
also inconsistent with the legislation of that State.
It is true, that a contrary doctrine has been held in a number of
the other States, but the grounds upon which it is placed do not
appear to have any real practicable application to the condition of
things in this State. It is said that the purpose of fences, in the
view of the common law, is to keep the owner's cattle in, and not
the cattle of others out. The Tonawanda Bailroad Company vs.
Munger, 5 Denio, 255. The reason of a law should never rest in
mere abstraction, without any application to the practical affairs of
society; and it is a maxim, that when the reason of a rule ceases, the
law itself ceases. Fences have two sides to them, and the real and
practical purpose of fences in this State has been to protect the
enclosure of the proprietor from the intrusion of animals without,
as well as to confine such as may be kept within.
If an action for damages be maintainable, for every instance
in which the cattle and other live stock of a person goes upon the
unenclosed lands of another without express license, more than ninetenths of the business men of this State become, for this cause,
tortfeasors every day of the year, and liable to suits for damages,
every day. It will not do to say, that although such right of action
existed, yet that it would be restrained by the rule De -minimis
non curat lex. This would be a refinement resulting in a distinction
without a difference. As there can be no wrong without a remedy,
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if there could be no recovery, the right of action in reality could
not exist.
This doctrine of the common law may be suitable to an old and
highly cultivated country, where all the lands, except the public
highways and commons, are under enclosure, but it has no suitable
and prover application in Ohio.
There is no law in Ohio, therefore, requiring the owners of cattle, horses, hogs, and other live stock, to keep them on his own
lands, or within an enclosure, and when he allows them to be at
large on the range of unenclosed lands, he cannot be said to act
unlawfully, or to be guilty of an omission of 'ordinary care
in the keeping or charge of his stock. For by so doing, he does
nothing more than that which has been customary, and which has
been, by common consent, done generally by the people since the
first settlement of the State. It is true, that extraordinary diligence,
or the. highest degree of care in the management of his stock, would
require the owner to confine it in stables, or within sufficient enclosures. But, under ordinary circumstances, all that can be required
of a person in the management of his property, is to exercise
that degree of care and diligence which men of common prudence, or, in other words, which men in general exercise in taking
care of their own property.
This right, however, to allow animals to run at large, has its
qualifications. The owner of animals, known to be mischievous
or dangerous, is bound to confine them, and if he omit this duty,
he is responsible for any loss or damage which any other person
may suffer thereby. And whenever the owner is notified of the
fact, that any of his creatures at large have become troublesome,
by means of breachy, unruly, or dangerous habits, it is his duty to
take them up without delay, and confine them. And the right to
allow animals, inoffensive in their habits, to be at large, does not imply a right in the owner to keep his- animals upon another's unenclosed lands against his consent. On the contrary, the owner may
drive them off as often as they come on to his lands, using no unnecessary violence ; or, he may at any time exclude them permanently,
by *the erection of a fence, or other means of enclosure. And,
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although there is no law in the State requiring any person to fence
or enclose his grounds, yet the owner who leaves his lands unenclosed, takes the risk of intrusions upon his grounds from the animals of other persons running at large. And the owner of the
animals, in allowing them to be at large, takes all the risk of their
loss or of injury to them by unavoidable accident, arising from any
danger into which they may wander.
Applying the views here expressed to the case under consideration,
upon what ground does the plaintiff's claim to reparation in damages rest? Where there is wanton, malicious, or intentional injury
done to a person, there is usually no difficulty in determining the
liability of the wrong-doer. But where a party suffering loss, seeks
redress upon the ground of mere negligence, or the omission of ordinary/ care on the part of another, in the conduct or manrer of prosecuting his lawful business, there are often difficulties requiring
close attention, and sometimes the utmost nicety of discrimination.
Admitting the plaintiff's right to allow his domestic animals to
be at large, under ordinary circumstances, it is claimed, that the
defendant, having appropriated its railroad track to the exclusive
purpose of running its locomotives and trains, and having the undoubted right to pass over its road, unmolested, at usual railroad
speed, the plaintiff's hogs had no right to be on the track, and were
wrongfully there; and that the plaintiff, in allowing them to be at
large in the vicinity of the railroad, where danger was apparent,
was in fault, and that the injury, therefore, having been caused, in
part at least, by the negligence of the plaintiff, he cannot maintain the action.
The defendant's right to the exclusive and unmolested use of its
railroad track, is undeniable. And it must be conceded that the
plaintiff had no rigLt to have his hogs on the track, and that they
were there improperly. But how came they there? If the plaintiff had placed them there, or, knowing them to be there, had
omitted to drive them off, he would have been, perhaps, precluded
from all claim to compensation. But it would appear, that in the
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exercise of the ordinary privilege of allowing these animals to be
at large, by the plaintiff, they accidentally and without his knowledge wandered upon the railroad track. The right of the defendant to the free, exclusive, and unmolested use of its railroad, is
nothing more than the right of every other land proprietor, in
the actual occupancy and use of his lands, and does not exempt it
from the duty enjoined by law upon every person, so to use his own
property as to do no unnecessary and avoidable injury to another.
Finding the animals upon the track, it was the'right, and, indeed,
the duty of the agents of the Company to drive them off, but not to
injure or destroy them by unnecessary violence. The owner of a
freehold estate in lands enclosed by a lawful fence, has a right to
expel trespassing animals which have broken through his enclosures,
but in doing so, he would become liable in damages to the owner of
the animals, if they be injured by the use of unnecessary and improper means; although the latter would be bound to make reparation for the injury done to the former by the trespassing animals.
It is not pretended that the railroad of the defendant was under
enclosure, through which the plaintiff's hogs had broken. It is
true, there is no law in Ohio compelling railroad companies to fence
their roads; but when they leave their roads open and unfenced,
they take the risk of intrusions thereon from animals running at
large, as do other land proprietors who have their lands unenclosed.
If a farmer unde, take to cu.tivate his ground in corn, without enclosing it, he would doubtless be troubled by the destructive intrusions of cattle running at large; but, without a sufficient fence, he
could not maintain an action against the owner of the animals for
the trespass. Had the defendant protected its railroad by a sufficient fence and cattle-guards, and the plaintiff's animals broken
over the enclosure, and gone upon the railway track, the plaintiff
would no doubt have been iable to the (_omp Liy in damages for
the trespass of the animals. The d .ei.dant constructed its railroad
with the knowledge that it wis he comm n custom of the country
to allow t m.stic ani-ials to run at large upon the unenclosed
ground of the i eig borhoid; and wit',out the precaution of enclosing its railro td, the Company coul I not sustain an action . g inst
28
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the owner of such animals at large as might happen to wander upon
the track of the road. The owner of the animals, in allowing them
to run at large, takes the risk of their loss or of injury to them by
unavoidable accident; and the Company, in leaving its road unprotected by enclosure, runs the risk of the occasional intrusions of
such animals upon its road, without any remedy against the owner.
The question in this case, however, is, what degree of care, if
any, was the defendant bound to use, under the circumstances, to
avoid injury to the plaintiff's property? That the plaintiff was in
the exercise of the highest degree of care over his property, cannot
be fairly claimed. A very prudent man would not allow his stock
to be at large in the immediate vicinity of an unenclosed railroad,
where the animals might accidentally, and without his knowledge,
wander off upon the railway track. The plaintiff, therefore, being
in one respect negligent or slightly in fault, it is claimed, that he
cannot maintain his action, even although the defendant could have
avoided injury to the animals, by the use of ordinary care and
caution.
It is true, that a party in an action for negligence cannot recover
damages which have resulted from his own negligence and want of
care; and it has been held, that the party seeking the redress must
not only show his adversary to be in the wrong, but also be prepared to prove that no negligence of his own has tended to increase
or consummate the injury. But the doctrine that where both parties
are in fault, the party sustaining the injury cannot recover, is subject to several very materialqualifications. An effort has been made,
however, to sustain its general application, upon the idea of a mutuality of obligation to observe due care and caution; and that negligence by one person absolves another from the duty of care and
diligence towards him. In the case of The Tonawanda Railroad
Company vs. Muiunger, (5 Denio, 266,) the Couirt said:
"Negligence is a violation of the obligation which enjoins care and caution in
what we do. But this duty is relative, and where it has no existence between particular parties, there can be no such thing as negligence in the legal sense of the
term. A man is under no obligations to be cautious and circumspect towards a
wrong-doer."
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This idea, however, that the liability in damages for negligence
depends upon any mutuality of obligation, is more fanciful than
real. Puffendorf places the right to reparation upon the ground of
an original moral duty, in language both graphic and expressive, as
will appear by the following extract:
"In the series of absolute duties, or such as oblige all men antecedently to any
human institution, this seems with justice to claim the first and noblest place, .that
no man hurt another; and in case of any hurt or damage done by him, he fail not to make
reparation. For this duty is not only the widest of all in its extent, comprehending
all men, on the bare account of their being men, but it is at the same time the most
easy of all to be performed, consisting for the most part purely in a negative abstinence from acting, except that its assistance is sometimes necessary in restraining
the passions, when they fight and struggle against reason, amongst which rebellious
desires, that boundless regard which we sometimes show to our own private advantage, seems to be the princfpaland the ringleader. Besides, it is the most necessary
of human duties, inasmuch as a life of society cannot possibly be maintained without it. For, suppose a man to do me no good, and not so much as to transact with
me in the common offices of life, yet provided he do me no harm, I can live with
him in tolerable comfort and quiet."

Rutherford, in his "Institutes of Natural Law," page 201, says,
that the origin of the right to reparation in damage is founded on a
principle of natural law.
It would seem that the liability to make reparation for an idijury,
rested, not upon the consideration of any reciprocal obligation, but
upon an original moral duty enjoined upon every person, so to conduct himsef, or exercise his own rights, as not to injure another.
It is conceded, that where the conduct of the -arty complained of
has been malicious, or his negligence so wanton and gross as to be
evidence of -voluntary injury, the injured party is entitled to redress,
although there has been negligence on his part. Wfynn vs. Allen,
5 W. & S. 524; Munroe vs. Leach, 7 Mete. 274; Parwell vs.
Boston and Worcester Railroad Company, 4 Metc. 49. But
where the injury arises neither from malice, design, nor wanton
and gross neglect, but simply the neglect of ordinary care and
caution, and the parties are mutually in fault, the negligence of
both being the immediate or proximate cause of the injury, it would
seem that a recovery is fairly denied, upon the ground that the
injured party must be taken to have brought the injury upon him-
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self. For the parties being mutually in fault, there can be no
apportionment of the damages, no rule existing to settle in such
case what the one shall pay more than the other.
This rule, however, that where both parties are in fanlt, and the
negligence of each a proximate cause of the injury, has been chiefly
applied to cases of collision between vessels, carriages, &c., passing
on the public thoroughfares.
The mere fact, however, that one person is in the wrong, does
not, in itself, discharge another from the observance of due and
proper care towards him, or the duty of so exercising his own rights
There have been numerous
as not to injure him unnecessarily.
adjudications, both in England and in this country, where parties
have been held responsible for their negligence, although the party
injured was at the time of the occurrence culpable, and, in some of
the cases, in the actual commission of a trespass.
In the case of the .rew Haven Steamboat and Transportation
Company vs. YVanderbilt, 16 Conn. Rep. 421, the Supreme Court
of Connecticut held it to be a principle of law, that while a party
on the one hand shall not recover damages for an injury which he
has brought upon himself, neither shall he, on the other hand, be
permitted to shield himself from an injury which he has done,
because the party injured was in the wrong, unless such wrong contributed to produce the injury; and even then, it would seem that
the party setting up such defence is bound to use common and ordinary caution to be in the right. This decision was founded on
the authority of Butterfield vs. Forrester, 11 East, 58, in which
Lord Ellenborough said: "A party is not to cast himself upon an
obstruction, which has been made by the fault of another, and avail
himself of it, if he does not himself use common and ordinary caution
to be in the right. In cases of persons riding upon what is considered to be the wrong side of the road, that would not authorize
another purposely to ride up against them."
In the case of Birge vs. Gardiner,19 Conn. Rep. 507, where
the defendant had set up a gate on his own land, by the side of a
lane, through which the plaintiff, a child between six and seven
years of age, with other children in the same neighborhood, were
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accustomed to pass from their places of residence to the highway;
and the plaintiff, in -passing along such lane, without the liberty of
any one, put his hands on the gate and shook it, in consequence of
which it fell on him and broke his leg-the Supreme Court of
Connecticut said: "There is a class of cases, in which defendants
have been holden responsiblefor their misconduct, although culpable
acts of trespass by the plaintiffs produced the consequences ;" and
held in this case, that if the defendant was guilty of negligence, he
was liable for the injury, unless the plaintiff, in doing what he did,
was guilty of negligence or misbehaving, or of the want of proper
care and caution; and that in determining this question, it was
proper to take into consideration the age and condition of the
plaintiff, &c., and that the fact that the plaintiffwas a trespasserin
the act which produced the injury complained of, would not necessarily preclude him from a recovery against a party guilty of negligence. This decision was sustained by the authority of Lynch vs.
.Nurdin, 1 Adolphus & Ellis, 35, (2 Stephen's Nisi rrius, 1015,)
which was an action for negligence committed by the defendant's
servant, in leaving his cart and horse standing for half an hour in
an open street, and while there the plaintiff, with other children,
got into and about the cart, and teased the horse, which moved,
whereby the plaintiff was injured. Lord Denman, C. J., said:
"In the present case, the fact appears that the plaintiff has done
wrong; he had no right to enter the cart, and abstaining from
doing so, he would have escaped the mischief. Certainly, he was a
co-operatingcause of his own misfortune, by doing an unlawful act;
and the question arises, whether that fact alone must deprive the
child of his remedy. The legal proposition, that one who has, by
his own negligence contributedto the injury of which he complains,
cannot maintain his action against another in respect of it, has
received some qualifications. Indeed, Lord Ellenborough's doctrine,
in Butterfleld vs. -Forrester, which has been generally adopted
since, would not set up the want of a superior degree of skill or
care as a bar to the claim for redress.
Ordinary care must
mean, that degree of care which may reasonably be expected from
a person in the plaintiff's situation."
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The same doctrine was substantially recognized in the case of
haplinvs. Hawes et al., 3 Carr. & Payne, 554, in wtiich Best, C. J.,
remarks:
"If the plaintiff's servant had such a clear space that he might
easily have got away, then I think he would have been so much to
blame as to prevent the plaintiff's recovering. But, on the sudden
a man may not be sufficiently self-possessed to know in what way to
decide; and in such a case, I think the wrong-doer is the party who
is to be answerable for the mischief, though it might have been Prevented by the other party's acting differently."
In the case of Bird vs. Holbrook, 15 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 91,
it was held, that where the defendant, who for the protection of his
property, some of which had been stolen, set a spring-gun, without
notice, in a walled garden, at a distance from his house, and the
plaintiff, having climbed over the wall in pursuit of a stray fowl,
was shot, he (the defendant) was liable in damages, although the
plaintiff brought the injury upon himself by trespassing upon the
defendant's enclosure.
The case of Vere vs. Lord Cawdor, 11 East, 567, was an
action of trespass for shooting and killing a dog of the plaintiff;
in which it was held, that a plea in bar constituted no justification
which set forth that the lord of the manor was possessed of a close,
and that the defendant, as his gamekeeper, killed the dog when
running after hares in that close, which was for the preservation of
hares; the plea not averring that it was necessary to kill the dog
for the preservation of the hares, &c. In this case, Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "The question is, whether the plaintiff's dog
incurred the penalty of death for running after a hare in another's
grounds? And if there be any precedent of that sort, which outrages all reason and sense, it is of no authority to govern other
cases."
The same doctrine was recognized in the case of 31arriottvs
Stanley, 39 Eng. 0. L. Rep. 559. Also in the case of Raisin vs.
lNitchelt et al., 38 Eng. C. L. Rep. 252, in which a jury returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for £250, with a special finding,
on inquiry, that there were faults on both sides ; and it was held,
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that notwithstanding this the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict,
as there might be faults with the plaintiff to a certain extent, and
yet not to such an extent as to prevent his recovering. The same
subject was very fully considered in the case of Deane vs. Clayton,
2 Eng. 0. L. Rep. 183, in which Dallas, J., remarks: "To the
next class of decisions I also equally accede; namely, those which
establish that you shall do no more than the necessity of the case
requires,when the excess may be in any way injurious to another,
a principle which pervades every part of the law of England, criminal as well as civil, and, indeed, belongs to all law that is founded
on reason and natural equity."
It is upon this ground, that where domestic animals, even those
which are breachy and unruly, break through the lawful enclosures
of another, the owner of such enclosure, although he has a right of
action for the trespass, and has the right to expel the trespassing
animals from his grounds, and that quickly and with no very kind
treatment; yet in so doing, he is not allowed to use unnecessary or
excessive violence; and if he does, and the animals be killed or
injured thereby, he will be liable to the owner of the animals in
damages. And this is in strict accordance with the decision in the
case of TVere vs. Cawdor, above mentioned. To the same effect is
the case of the Mayor of Colchester vs. Brooke, 53 Eng. Com. L.
R. 376, cited in 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 812, where it was held,
that, although the plaintiff was chargeable with wrong and negligence
in placing and keeping the deposit of a bed of oysters in the channel of a navigable stream, which created a public nuisance, yet the
defendant was not justifiable in running his vessel upon the deposit
and greatly injuring the oysters, when there was room to pass in the
stream without it, and the injury could have been avoided by the use
of reasonable care and diligence. This is only carrying out the rule,
that though a man do a lawful thing, yet if any damage thereby be
done to another, which he could have reasonably and properly
avoided, he will be held liable. So it is said, if a man lop a tree on
his own ground, and the boughs fall upon another's premises, ipso
invito, and do an injury, an action lies. So also, where a man in
building his own house, lets fall a piece of timber on his neigbor's
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house and injures it. And likewise, where a party so negligently
constructed a hayrick on the extremity of his land, that in consequence of its spontaneous ignition, his neighbor's house was burnt
down, an action has been sustained, Vaughan vs. Menlone, 3 Bing.
NT. C. 468.
And where persons have the control of dangerous instruments,
the law, out of regard to the safety of the community, requires them
to be kept with the utmost care. So that, where a party being possessed of a loaded gun, sent a young girl after it with directions to
take the priming out, which was accordingly done, but an injury
was done to the child of another person, in consequence of the girl
presenting the gun and drawing the trigger, when the gun went off,
the party was held liable in damages to the person injured. -Dixon
vs. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198.
Another modification of the rule that the concurrence of the plaintiff's-negligence with that of the defendant will defeat the claim to
reparation, is that where the plaintiff, knowing the danger, voluntarily placed his property in an exposed and hazardous position or in
more than ordinary danger from the lawful acts of the defendant.
Sedgwick on Damages, 471. This principle was settled by the Supreme Court of New York in the case of Cook vs. The Champlain
Transportation Company, 1 Denio, 99, in which it was held,
that where a person, in the lawful use of his own property, exposes
it to the danger of accidental injury from the lawful acts of others,
he does not thereby lose his remedy for an injury caused by the culpable negligence of such other persons ; so that the owner of land on
the shore of a stream, or lake, or adjoining the track 'of a railroad,
may lawfully build on his land, though the situation be one of exposure and hazard, and be nevertheless, entitled to protection against
the negligent acts of persons lawfully passing the same with vessels
or carriages, propelled by steam engines, by which such buildings
may be set on fire, on the ground that the owner undertook the risk
and hazard of injury by mere accident, but not the risk of injury by
negligence.
But there is yet another element in this class of cases, which occasionally has an important bearing upon the right of redress. The
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negligence of the injured party, to preclude him from a recovery,
must be in part, at least an immediate or proximate cause of the injury. To this effect was the decision of the case of Dariesvs. Mann,
10 Meeson & Welsby, 545.
The plaintiff having fettered the fore feet of an ass belonging to
him, turned it into a public highway; and at the time in question,
the ass was grazing on the off side of a road about eight yards wide,
when the defendant's team of three horses, coming down a slight
descent, at what the witness termed a "smartish pace," ran against
the ass, knocked it down, and the wheels passing over it, it died
soon after. The ass was fettered at the time, and it was proved,
that the driver of the wagon was some little distance behind the
horses. The learned judge, (Erskine, before whom the case was
tried at the Worcester assizes) told the jury, that though the act of
the plaintiff, in leaving the donkey on the highway, so fettered as
to prevent his getting out of the way of carriages traveling along it,
might be illegal, still, if the proximate cause of the injury, was attributable to the want of proper conduct on the part of the driver of
the wagon, the action was maintainable against the defendant, and
his Lordship directed them, if they thought the accident might have
been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care, on the part of the
driver, to find for the piaintiff.
After a verdict for the plaintiff, on a motion for a new trial, which
came before the Exchequer, Lord Abinger, C. B. said:
"I am of opinion that there ought to be no rule in this case.
The defendant has not denied that the ass was lawfully in the highway, and therefore, we must assume it to have been lawfully there.
But even were it otherwise, it would have made no difference: for
as the defendant might, by the exercise of proper care, have avoided
injuring the animal, and did not; he is liable for the consequences
of his negligence, -though the animal may have been improperly
there."
The Supreme Court of Vermont, in the case of Trow vs. The
Vermont Central Railroad Company, 24 Vermont Rep. 488, in
which this doctrine is discussed and fully sustained, said; "When
the negligence of the defendant is proximate, and that of the plain-
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tiff remote, the action can then well be sustained, although the plaintiff is not entirely without fault. This seems to be settled now in
England and in this country. Therefore, if there be negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, yet if, at the time when the injury was committed, it might have been avoided by the defendant, in the exercise
of reasonable care and prudence, an action will lie for the injury.
So in this case, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence or even of
positive wrong, in placing his horse in the highway, the defendant
was bound to exercise the reasonable care and diligence in the use
of its road, and management of the engine and train, and if for
want of that care, the injury arose, the defendant is liable."
From a review of the decisions on this subject both in England
and in this country, the following conclusions appear fairly deducible:
That the general rule is, that where the parties are mutually in
fault, or in other words where negligence of the same nature in
each party has co-operated to produce the injury, the party sustaining the loss, is without remedy: but that this rule is subject to the
following qualifications:
1st. The injured party, although in fault to some extent at the
time, may, notwithstanding this, be entitled to reparation in damages for an injury arising from the negligence of another, which
could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care on the part of the injured party.
2d. Where the negligence of the defendant is the proximate cause
of an injury, but that of the plaintiff only remote, consisting of some
act or omisson not occurring at the time of the injury, the action for
reparation is maintainable.
3d. When a party has in his custody or control dangerous instruments, or means of injury, and negligently uses them, or places
them in a situation unsafe to others, and another person although in
the commission of a trespass, or otherwise somewhat in the wrong
at the time, sustains an injury thereby, he will be entitled to redress.
4th. And where the plaintiff, in the ordinary exercise of his own
rights, allows his property to be in an exposed and hazardous position, and it becomes injured by the neglect of ordinary care and cau-
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tion on the part of the defendant, he is entitled to reparation, for
the reason, that, although by allowing his property to be exposed
to danger, he took upon himself the risk of loss or injury by mere
accident, he did not thereby discharge the defendant from the duty
of observing ordinary care and prudence, or in other words voluntarily incur the risk of injury by the negligence of another.
The application of these rules, which appear reasonable and just
removes all difficulty in the disposition of the case before us. The
act of the plaintiff, allowing his hogs to be at large in the neighborhood of the railroad, where. they were exposed to the danger of getting upon the railway track and being injured, if it could be said to
be tributary to the injury at all, was only a remote cause of the injury, and in the voluntary exposure of his property to danger, in the
exercise of his lawful rights, he took upon himself the risk of injury
to his property by mere accident, but not the risk of injury by the
defendants' negligence. And the defendant was chargeable with
some degree of negligence, at least by the omission to have its railroad enclosed by suitable fences and cattle guards. On this subject,
the Supreme Court of Vermont, in the case of Trow vs. The Vermont
Central B. B. Co. before mentioned, say: "The duty of maintaining fences and erecting cattle guards for such purposes, is imposed
on the corporation not only as a matter of safety in the use of their
roads and running their engines thereon, but also, as a matter of
security to the property of those living near and contiguous to the
road. And this arises from the consideration that they must know
and reasonably expect that without such precautions, such injuries
will naturally and frequently arise. And when for the distance
mentioned in this case, no precautions of that kind were used upon
this road, and in a place so public and common, we think as a matter of law, there was that neglect which will render the corporation
liable for injuries arising solely from that cause."
This is in accordance with the decision of the same court, in the case
of Quimby vs. The Vermont CentralBailroad Co. 23 Vermont IR.
388, in which it was held, that although the charter of the Company made no provision in reference to the obligation to maintain
fences upon the line of the road, the general law of the state, in
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reference to the obligation of adjoining land owners to maintain the
division fences between them, did not apply, but that the obligation
to maintain the fences rested primarily upon the company, and until they have either built the fences, or paid the land owner for doing it, a sufficient length of time, to enable him to do it, the mere
fact, that cattle get upon the road from the land adjoining, is no
ground for imputing negligence to the owners of the cattle." So
also, the case of "1 The matter of the Rensselaer and Saratoga Railroad Company, 4 Paige, 558.
It being the right of the owners of animals in Ohio, to let them
be at large, it follows, that the mere fact of allowing them to be at
large generally, cannot be a ground of imputing negligence to the
owner. But where the owner allows them to be at large in the immediate vicinity of an unenclosed railroad, where they will be liable
to wander upon the railroad, he cannot be said to exercise that high
degree of care and prudence in reference to his own interests, which
men of more than ordinary care and caution, take of their own property. And admitting the plaintiff in this case, to have been chargeable in some slight degree with negligence, in this respect, yet the
defendant was certainly chargeable in at least an equal degree of neglect for want of proper care in enclosing its railroad with fences and
cattle guards. The construction of the railroad could not abridge or
take away the existing right of the people of the State to allow
their animals to be at large, although the danger which it created
may have enjoined more care and prudence on the owners of animals with regard to their own interests in letting them be at large
in the immediate neighborhood of the railroad. But the Company
having constructed its road through a country, where it was well
known that domestic animals were suffered to run at large, and
where the custom and right in this respect, must be unquestionable,
the consideration of the inevitable exposure of the road while unenclosed, to such casualties and injuries, as that of animals running
at large, getting upon it, enjoined upon the Company the exercise
of at least some degree of care and caution, the duty of enclosing
its road. And by the omission of this, the defendant was at least
as much in fault, and at least as much chargeable with negligence,
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as the plaintiff. And in each case, that is, in allowing the animals to be at large by the plaintiff, and in having the railroad unenclosed by the defendant, the negligence was remote, each only
remotely or consequentially contributing to cause the injury If
there had existed no other negligence than this on either side,
and the loss had occurred from unavoidable accident in running
the train upon the hogs, when the agents of the Company were in
the full exercise of due care and caution, in the discharge of their
duty, the plaintiff would probably have been without redress. The
turning point of this cause therefore, as presented, would seem to
be, not whether there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff in
allowing his hogs to be at large, or negligence on the part of the
defendant in omitting to enclose its road by fences and cattle guards,
but whether the agents of the defendant, at the time of the occurrence, exercised reasonable and ordinary care to avoid the injury.
Having left its road unenclosed, and exposed to the intrusion of
animals at large coming upon the track, it was the duty of the
company, acting through its agents, to use ordinary and reasonable
care and diligence to avoid all unnecessary injury to the animals
found accidentally in the way of its train upon the road. What
amounts to ordinary care on the part of the agents of the company,
depends on the peculiar nature of the employment, and the circumstances attending the transaction. The defendant's agents were
engaged in the management of powerful and dangerous machinery
moving with great rapidity, to the skillful and safe conduct of
which, is entrusted not merely property, but the safety of human
beings, to a large extent. The first and paramount object of the
attention of the agents of the company, is a proper regard for* the
safety of the persons and property in their charge on the train.
The plaintiff had no right to expect his property, under the circumstances, to be protected unless it could be done consistently with the
higher obligations and responsibilities resting on the agents of the
defendants. In this particular employment a higher degree of
skill and diligence is exacted of the persons engaged, than that
which is requisite in the ordinary pursuits of life. For the protection of the persons and property of individuals in charge of the
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agents of the defendant, on the train of cars, the company was
held to a high degree of care and diligence ; and with a due regard to
this paramount duty, they were bound to the exercise of what, in
that peculiar employment, would be ordinary and reasonable care
to avoid doing any unnecessary injury to the property of the plaintiff which happened accidentally to be upon the railway track.
The Court of Common Pleas, however, in this case, refused upon
request, to charge the jury, that the agents of the defendant were
held to the exercise of ordinary care and caution to av6id injury to
the plaintiff's property thus upon the railroad ; but on the contrary,
charged that the hogs, being unlawfully on the road, the defendant's
agents were not required to check the specd of the train and avoid
injury to the animals, even if they could easily and readily have
done so.

This ruling of the Court of Common Pleas is in direct conflict
with the doctrine of Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Trere vs.
Cowdor, in which he said, "that the idea, that the plaintiff's dog
had incurred the penalty of death, by running after a hare on
another's grounds, outrages all reason and sense ;" in conflict with
the doctrine, that even in case of a trespass, no unnecessary and
excessive violence shall be used to the injury of another, a principle,
which Dallas, J. said, "pervades every part of the law of England,
criminal as well as civil; and indeed belongs to all law that is
founded on reason and natural equity; contrary to the humane
spirit of our law against cruelty to animals; contrary to the
doctrine, that a man in the exercise of his lawful rights, shall use
reasonable and ordinary care to avoid injury to another; and contrary to the whole course of adjudication in England and in this
country generally, on mere questions of negligence.
But it is due to the court below, to say, that its charge to the
jury, was in strict accordance with the decisions in New York,
Pennsylvania, and perhaps those of several other states, in cases of
suits against railroad companies upon grounds similar to that, for
which this suit was brought. But the decisions in those states all
rest upon the ground, that it is unlawful for the owners of
domestic animals to allow them to be at large; and that when they
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are at large, and happen to stray upon a railroad, the person in
charge of trains on it, are absolved from the duty of using care to
avoid unnecessary injury to them. It has been shown that this
doctrine has no application in this state; those decisions, therefore,
are of no authority here. We recognize the maxim, Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non icedas, as a principle, founded in justice, and essential to the peace, order, and well being of the community; as applicable to the enjoyment of all property, and the exercise of all
rights incident thereto, to the protection of which the weakest are
entitled, and from the observance of which, the most powe)ful are
not exempt.
For the error in the charge of the court below to the jury, the
judgment is reversed, and the cause i-emanded for further proceedings.

In New Jersey Chancery, October Term, 1854.
JOHN D. GLOVER AND OTHERS vs. ALEXANDER A. POWELL AND OTHERS.
Bill for Injunction.
1. In 1760, the Legislature of New Jersey authorized certain owners of meadow
lands along Little Timber Creek to dam the said creek. Such act is constitutional,
and vests an interest; it is more than a mere license, and cannot be revoked by
the State.
2. The Legislature must be the sole judge and arbiter in determining what streams
shall be navigable, and when they may be obstructed and their navigation destroyed for public necessity or convenience.

3. An individual cannot question the legislation of the State as to the rights of
navigation, unless he can call to his aid the paramount authority of the general
government.
4. What constitutes a navigable stream.
5. In 1854, the Legislature passed an act for the removal of the dam erected and
continued under the act of 1760; the act of 1854 violates the Constitution of the
State, and an injunction will be granted by this Court to restrain any action
under it.
6. A forfeiture cannot be declared by the Legislature, it can only be done by the
Courts in due process of law.
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The bill alleges that the complainants are the owners in severalty
and in fee simple of about 128 f'a acres of meadow land, situate in
the township of Union, in the county of Camden, on both sides of
a small stream of water, called Little Timber Creek, emptying into
the River Delaware, five miles below Camden City; that the said
meadow was reclaimed from the tide waters of the Delaware some
time in or previous to the year 1760, by the owners of the said
meadow, who at their own expense erected a dam about a quarter
of a mile in length at the mouth of the creek, with sluices and other
water works inthe dam so as to exclude the title from the meadow
and drain the water therefrom, and by digging ditches; and have
thus greatly improved the meadow. That the expenses of such dam
and improvements have cost not less than $8,000; that to remove the
said dam would wholly destroy the value of the meadow and improvements ; that the said creek is about 125 feet wide at its mouth,
that it gradually becomes narrower as you pass up it; that if the
dam should be removed, the tide would flow up about two miles ;
that its depth varies,-at some places it would probably be entirely
bare at low water, and at other places five or six feet in depth, and
that it never was or could have been, and would not now, if the
said dam should be removed, be of any material importance for
purposes of navigation ; that the complainants are unable to state
by what authority the dam and water works were originally erected,
but that on the 20th day of November, 1760, the Legislature of the
Colony of New Jersey passed an act entitled "an Act to enable the
owners and possessors of meadow lying in Little Timber Creek, in
the county of Gloucester, to support and maintain a certain bank,
dam, and other water works lately erected across said creek, in order
to prevent the tide from overflowing the same, and to keep the
former water course of said creek open and clear." That the said
dam and water works so authorized by said act were duly erected,
and are still kept up by the owners of said meadow, and that by
taxes levied from time to time upon the said owners and their
lands, under the said act the said dam and water works have ever
since be n maintained, and the water course kept open and cle r.
That the said dam and water works are the absolute property of
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the complainants, and that it is not competent for the Legislature.
of New Jersey to require or authorize the said works to be removed
without providing compensation.
That the Legislature of New
Jersey, at its last session passed an Act entitled "an Act to restoro
the navigation of Little Timber Creek, in the township of Union, in
the county of Camden," as follows, to wit:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of tie
State of NArew Jersey, That Little Timber Creek is hereby declared
to be a public highway, in all respects as fully as it was before the
said creek was dammed at the mouth or entrance thereof into the
River Delaware, and the -Township Committee of said Township
are hereby authorized and required at the expense of said township
to remove the said dam, and thereby open the navigation of the
said Little Timber Creek, on the first day of September, 1854."
The bill further alleges that the said act is unconstitutional and
void, because it does not make and provide compensation to the complainants for the injury they will sustain by the removal of the dam.
That the defendants, who are the said Committee, intend on the
first of September to remove the dam and water-works. The bill
prays that the defendants and their successors in office may be
restrained from moving the said dam or any part thereof, and
thereby or otherwise opening the navigation of said Little Timber
Creek.
A copy of the Act of 1760 was annexed to the bill.
On filing the bill, the complainants applied to the Chancellor for
an injunction. The Chancellor ordered a copy of the bill of complaint to be served on the defendants, and a rule to show cause on
a day and at a place therein mentioned, why an injunction should
not issue.
The defendants filed a joint and several answer.
The answer alleges, that before the said dam wvas erected, the tide
did flow up said creek for more than two miles, so that the said creek
was, for that distance, navigable for scows, barges, shallops and
other flat-bottomed vessels, of not less than twenty-five tons burthen, and of a depth, for that distance, of not less than five or six
feet, and for the greater part of that distance of a much greater
24
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depth, and which, if said dam had not been erected, would have
been of material importance for navigation. That they do not believe the said dam was erected by authority of law, but charge that
the said dam and water works were erected by the unauthorized
and illegal action of the owners of said meadow, for their own private purposes, without regard to the navigation; and were, when
originally erected, and until sanctioned by the Act of 1760, a purpresture and nuisance, liable to be at any time abated. That in 1760,
the navigation of said creek, being supposed to be of little immediate
importance, the Legislature passed the act referred to, subject to the
provisoes and conditions therein contained; that the said Act made
it the duty of the said land owners to keep the water course of the
creek between certain dams mentioned in the said Act, and comprising the navigable part of said creek, open and clear, so as to give
the water a sufficient fall from off the meadows at the head of the
same; which condition and proviso of said Act was essentially necessary, as well to preserve the channel of said creek for future use
for navigation, as by maintaining the drainage of said meadows to
prevent the water from becoming stagnant and injurious to the
health of the adjacent country. That the said Act gave no right
of property, absolute or otherwise, as against the public, and the
then Colony of New Jersey, to the said owners of said meadows,
dam and water works, and in and to the bed of the said creek, but
was simply a license or toleration of a nuisance, and authorized the
continuance of the said dam for the purpose of draining the meadows during the pleasure of the said Legislature, the said license
being liable to revocation whenever the public interest required it.
The answer further alleges that the natural water course of said
creek has not been kept open and clear, according to the terms of
the Act; that in consequence of this neglect, the water has become
stagnant, the meadows deteriorated in value, and the health of the
inhabitants of the adjacent country, and more particularly of the
city of Gloucester, has been greatly injured, and the said stagnant
waters have become a nuisance highly injurious to the inhabitants;
that in the opinion of said defendants, if the said dam were removed, the meadows would be improved by the deposits, &c.; that
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the said dam is so injurious to the health of the inhabitants as to
require its abatement; that the settlement and openirig of the
country, and the increase of the population adjacent to the creek,
making the navigation of increased importance, and the nuisance
requiring the opening of the creek to the tide, the Legislatufe, at
its last session, passed the Act recited in the bill of complainants;
they admit that they are the township committee, and that as such
officers, and as agents of the Legislature, they submit that the
Legislature have a right to direct the dam to be removed, &c.
Counsel were heard on both sides.
A. Browning and Ir. L. Dayton, for complainants, insistedFirst. That the legislature have power and authority to authorize
the damming of small navigable creeks, Wilson et al vs. Black Bird
Creek .Marsh Co., 2 Peters, 245; Cox vs. State, 3 Blackford, 197;
Sinickson vs. Johnson, 2 Harr. 152.
That the power had been frequently exercised by the legislature,
Learning & Spicer, 554, Allison's Laws of N. J. under word Marsh
52 acts are found of this character, Gifford's Index, letter D.
Second. The act of 1760 has the same force and effect as if it authorized the original erection of the dam, 2 Kent, 616; 3 U. S. D.
244, title Principal and Agent, § 273-4-5.
Third. The power in the State is based upon the principle, that
in the State is vested the right of property in the bed of the river,
Angell on Tide Waters, 20-22. The dam is the private property of
the individual who erected it.
Fourth. The Act is unconstitutional. Art. 1, § 16 of the Constitution of N. J. dclares, "Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." And again, Art. 4, section
7, p. 9, "Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property, for public use, without just compensation fi: st made to the owners.
Fifth. Vested rights of property acquired by virtue of a statute
cannot be divested by repeal of the statute, Benson et al.vs. The
Mayor, &c.,of New York et al, 10 Barb. 223.
Sixth. Where a license is executed, and the licensee has acquired
rights, the license cannot be revoked so as to divest those rights,
without compensation, 7 U. S. D. Tit. License, 346.
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They also cited, 2 Iarr. 314, 3 ib. 200 ; Angell on Water Courses,
100, 1 Conn. 382; 1 Baldw, 205; 2 J. C. C., 162; 4W. C. C. R.,
601.
T. P. C(ar2enter and J. F. Randolph, for defendants, contra
cited Iargrave's Tracts, 8, 9; Woolrych on Water Courses, 40;
Angell on Tide Waters 80, 89; Arundill vs. 11cCullough, 10 Mass.
70, Saxton r. 380; People vs. SaratogaB. B. Co., 15 Wend. 185; 2
Black. Com. 347; 2 Zab. R. 647; Oliarles River Bridge, 11 Peters,
544; Providence Banks vs. Billings, 4 Peters, 514; Clitty's Prerogative, 391 ; 15 Vin. 94, License, E, note; 6 Watts & Serg't, 101;
9 ib. 9; Rundel vs. D. & B. C. Co., 1 Wallace, Jr. 275 ; Same case,
14 How'd, 80; 13 Conn. 87; 2 Am. L. Ca. 506; 11 Metcalf, 55;
2 Denio, 461; 1 Waterman's Eden on Injuno. 138, (note 1).
WILLIAMSON, Chancellor.-Whcn this bill was filed and on application for an injunction, an order was made, that a copy of
the bill should be served on the defendants, and that they should
show cause, on a day named, why an injunction should not issue.
The defendants availed themselves of the opportunity thus afforded
of putting in their answer to the bill, and of being heard by their
counsel in opposition to the a)plication.
The bill is purely an injunction bill, and asks that the defendants
may be perpetually restrained from demolishing a dam and water
works connected with it, at the mouth of Little Timber Creek, in
the County of Camden.
Little Timber Creek is a small creek emptying into the river Delaware, about five miles below the city of Camden. The tide, when
not obstructed, ebbs and flows about two miles up the creek. Sometime in, or previous to the year 1760, the owners of the meadow
land adjacent to the creek, for the purpose of improving their
meadows by the exclusion of the tide water, built a dam of about
a quarter of a mile wide at the mouth of the creek, with sluices
and other fixtures. In November, 1760, the legislature of the then
Colony of New Jersey, passed an Act to enable the owners of
meadows along the creek to support and maintain this dam and fixtures, erected for the aforesaid purpose. The Act, after reciting
the erection of the dam and its purposes, enacted that the said bank,
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dam, and all other water works already erected, or which should
thereafter be found necessary to be erected, for the more effectual
preventing the tide from overflowing the meadoivs lying on the said
creek, should be erected, supported and maintained at the equal expense of all the owners and possessors of the meadows, according
to the proportion that each of the said owners or possessors then or
thereafter, might hold on the said creek between certain points in
the Act designated.
It further enacts, that the natural water course of the creek
should be kept clear, and specified the manner in which it should be
done. It then provides for the election, by all the land owners,
yearly, of two managers, and empowers these managers to assess
the owners and possessors of the meadows in such sum or sums of
money, as shall be by them, or the survivor of them, deemed necessary for the supporting, repairing and maintaining the bank, dam,
and other water works. It confers upon the managers power to
collect the assessments by suit at law; or, if the owner of the
meadow assessed is absent, and beyond the reach of legal process,
it provides for the leasing of his land for the purpose of paying
such assessment. There are other provisions of the Act to carry
out its important object, viz: to make it compulsory on all meadow
owners, whose lands are benefited and rendered more valuable by
the dam and works, to contribute to repair and maintain them. This
Act was accepted by the owners of the meadows. Managers were
elected under it, and under and by virtue of its provisions the bank,
dam, and water works have been repaired and maintained to this
day. It is lleged that upwards of eight thousand dollars have been
expended on the works,-that the value of the meadows has
thereby been greatly enhanced, and that the demolishing the dam
would destroy this value.
The Legislature, at its last session, passed an Act declaring Little
Timber creek to be a public highway, in all respects as fully as it
was before the said creek was dammed at its mouth; and the township
committee is authorized and required, at the expense of the township, to remove the dam, and thereby open the navigation of the
creek, on the first day of September next. It is to enjoin the
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township committee of the township of Union, in the county of
Camden, from discharging the duty imposed upon them by this Act,
that this bill is filed.
In the first place, it is insisted that the dam at the mouth of
Little Timber creek destroys the navigation of a navigable stream
where the tide ebbs and flows, and that the Legislature have no right
or power to authorize such an obstruction.
It appears from the pleadings, that at certain states of the tide,
this creek, if unobstructed, is navigable by small fiat-bottomed
boats for at least two miles from its mouth. It does not appear
that it ever has been used for the purposes of navigation. It has
not been navigated since the year 1760. There is no allegation on
the part of the defendants, and nothing in the case to show that its
navigation now is demanded by the public interest, or that, as a
navigable stream, it would be any way beneficial to the public for
the purposes of trade or agriculture. Admit, for the sake of the
argument, that the State Legislature has not the power permanently
to obstruct or to destroy any navigable river within its territorial
jurisdiction, it does not follow that any creek, or rivulet, in which
the tide ebbs and flows, and which may be used at certain tides by
small boats for individual convenience, is to be dignified with the
appellation of an arm of the sea, or navigable river, and as such,
beyond the jurisdiction or control of the Legislature, except as a
public highway. Washed, as more than two-thirds of the borders of
our State are by the sea, and by the rivers Hudson and Delaware, and
their bays, the small creeks and rivers made by the force of the tides
into the upland, in extent from a mile to six miles, are almost innumerable. At high tides many of them may be navigated with
small fiat-bottomed boats, and have been occasionally used with advantage by individuals owning the adjacent meadows, for the transportation of grass and perhaps other articles of merchandise. Many
of them have been cut off from the sea under the express sanction of the Legislature, for the purposes of reclaiming and improving the adjacent meadow land and extending public roads, and
the navigation of many more has been totally destroyed without
any legal authority, and no complaint made by the public or by in-
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dividuals, on account of the manifest advantage resulting to the
Most certainly a court of justice
public from the obstruction.
would not be justified in declaring that there is no authority in the
State to determine when such streams shall be considered as navigable rivers, and be maintained and protected as such, or to determine when they may be obstructed, and their navigation destroyed
for the public necessity or convenience. The Legislature must be the
sole judge and arbiter for the public in this matter, and courts have
no right to question this authority. In the exercise of powers conferred by the Constitution upon the General Government, questions
may arise between it and the State governments; but no individual
can question the legislation of the State in reference to what is
called common rights of navigation, unless he can summon to his
aid in some way the legislation of the General Government, which
is of paramount authority. The authorities will, I think, be found to
sustain. this doctrine. Some will be found to go much further, and
to declare that the mere fact of the tide ebbing and flowing, and of
the channel being such as to make the creek navigable at certain
periods of the tide, does not entitle it to the protection of the court
as a public navigable river. In the case of The King vs. Montague and others, 4 B. & C. 596, 10 E. C. L. 413, it was decided
that a public right of navigation in a river or creek may be extinguished either by an act of Parliament, or writ of ad quod damnum, and inquisition thereon, or under certain circumstances by
Commissioners of Sewers, or by natural causes, such as the recess of
the sea, or an accumulation of mud, &c., and where a public road,
obstructing a channel (once navigable) has existed for so long a
time, that the state of the channel at the time when the road was
made, cannot be proved, there is a presumption in favor of the existing state of things, and it must be presumed that the right of
navigation was extinguished in one of the modes before mentioned,
and the road cannot be removed as a nuisance to that navigation.
In the case of The May]or of Lynn vs. Turner, Cowp. 86, which
was a suit brought against the Corporation of Lynn for not repairing
and cleansing a certain creek, into which the tide of the sea was
accustomed to flow and reflow, Lord Mansfield, on the argument,
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asked counsel, "1How does it appear that this is a navigable river ?
The flowing and reflowing of the tide does not make it so, for there
are many places into which the tide flows, which are not navigable
rivers, anl the place in question may be a creek in their own private estate."
The flux and reflux of the tide is prima facie evicence of a navigable river, but it is not conclusive evidence, Jliles vs. Bose and
another, 5 Taunt. 706. The strength of this primafacie evidence,
says Bayley, J., in the case of Rex vs. Montague, arising from the
flux and reflux of the tide, must depend upon the situation and
*natureof the channel. If it is a broad and deep channel calculated
for the purposes of commerce, it would be natural to conclude that
it has been a public navigation; but if it is a petty stream, navigable
only at certain periods of the tide, and then only for a very short
time and by very small boats, it is difficult to suppose that it ever
has been a public navigable channel. In Commonwealth vs. Breed,
4 Pick. 460, an information in the nature of a quo warranto
was filed by the direction of the Legislature, alleging that Breed,
the respondent, had erected and still maintains a bridge across a
navigable arm of the sea between Chelsea and Belle Island, whereby
the passing of vessels is obstructed, and requiring him to answer by
what authority he claims to keep up and maintain the bridge. The
respondent set up a law of Massachusetts, passed in the year 1816,
which authorized him to build a bridge convenient for the accommodation of the proprietors of Belle Island; that it should be built
With a draw not less than 15 feet wide; that the proprietor should
at all times, when necessary, have the draw raised at his own experse for the convenient passing of vessels through the same. The
Solicitor General replied, that the statute granted the respondent
the privilege of erecting a bridge for the private accommodation of
passing and repassing'to and from the island, the same being the
pri ate estate of the respondent, and that the grant was not for any
public eas-ement or convenience; that it was the interest of the
state that the draw should be of sufficient width to permit the
convenient passing of al such vessels as had been accustomed to
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navigate the inlet before the erection of the bridge, and with such
necessary piers, &c.
The respondent rejoined that he had complied with the provisions
of the statute, and thereupon issue was joined. The jury found,
that the water above the bridge was navigable for coasting vessels
of one hundred tons burthen, and was used before the building of
the bridge, and that the draw was not of sufficient width. The
Court said the Legislature are to determine when the public convenience and necessity require such an obstruction to navigation, and
upon what terms and conditions it shall be allowed.
In the case of Rowe vs. Granite Bridge Corporation,21 Pick.
344, the Company were authorized to construct a road from Milton
to Dover; and to locate, build and construct a bridge across Neponset
River in continuation of the line of the road. The plaintiff was the
owner of a piece of salt meadow in Milton. He alleged that from
time immemorial there had been a creek commencing at the highest
part of the marsh, and passing through it to Neponset River, which
creek was of sufficient depth and width to admit boats, gondolas,
and light craft to pass up and down the creek in common tides, and
that such craft might be used to advantage in removing the crops
of hay from the marsh, that the defendants had laid out their road
over the marsh and across the creek, and were proceeding to fill up
the creek. An injunction was asked to restrain them. The
Court decided that a creek in a salt meadow, in order to be
deemed navigable must not be merely sufficient to float a small boat
at high water, but must be navigable generally and commonly to
some purpose useful to trade and agriculture. C. J. Shaw, in
giving the opinion of the court, says, "It is not every ditch, in
which the salt water ebbs and flows through the extensive salt
marshes along the coast, and which serve to admit and drain off the
salt water from the marshes which can be considered a navigable
stream. Nor is it every small creek, in which a fishing skiff or a
gunning canoe can be made to float at high water, which is deemed
navigable. But in order to have this character, it must be navigable
to some purpose, useful to trade and agriculture. It is not a mere
possibility of being used under some circumstances, as at extraordi-

378

GLOVER AND OTHERS vs. POWELL AND OTIIERS.

nary high tides, which will give it the character of a navigable
stream, but it must be generally and commonly useful to some
purpose of trade or agriculture."
In the case of Thwmpson, Wilson and others, plaintiffs in error
vs. the Black Bird Oreek H1arsh Company, defendants, 2 Peters,
245, Black Bird Creek, in the State of Delaware, was navigable
for schooners of upwards of ninety tons burthen; under an act of the
State of Delaware, the defendants constructed a dam across the
creek by which the navigation was obstructed. The court decided
that the act of the Legislature authorizing the dam was not in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
There can, I think, he no doubt that the Legislature had the power
to authorize the erection of a dam at the mouth of Little Timber
Creek. There is nothing in the case to show that it ever was a
navigable stream, or that a boat of any size ever passed up it.
The defendants further insist, that the dam having been originally
made and constructed without the authority of the State, the true
construction of the act of 1760 is to give to the defendants not a
grant of any right which belonged to the state but a mere license
to continue a nuisance already existing, and that this license was
revocable at pleasure.
It may well be questioned upon the case presented to the court,
whether this dam was originally a nuisance, and whether it could
not be maintained without Legislative sanction. If it was not a
navigable river, then it might be obstructed without the authority
of the Legislature; and although the fact of the ebb and flow of the
tide is prima facie evidence of its being a navigable river, it may
be doubted whether the case presented does not overcome such
evidence. At any rate, if the question for injunction turned upon
that point, the court would not permit the defendants to be deprived
of their property without affording them the opportunity of overcoming such evidence.
But while it is true that the dam was not originally erected under
the act of 1760, the construction of this act contended for by the
defendants cannot be admitted. The dam has been maintained
under that act for nearly a century. The act did not authorize the
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owners of the meadows simply to continue the dam, but it gave the
authority of the State to compel its continuance. It has not been
continued by the voluntary act of individuals, but they have been
compelled to maintain it by the power and force of law.
This act created a quasi corporation, provided for the annual
election of managers, conferred upon them power to assess property,
and clothed them with authority to enforce these assessments. How
then, with any propriety, can it be said, that this act was a license
only to continue a nuisance already existing ?
Whether this act can be repealed at pleasure so as to deprive
parties who have acquired rights under it, is the important question
upon which this case turns.
The act of the Legislature passed the 17th March, 1854, which
authorizes and requires the Township Committee of the township of
Union to remove the dam, is in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, which declares that no State shall "pass any bill of
attainder, ez post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." It is a virtual repeal of the act of 1760. The last named
act was a grant, and granted valuable powers to the owners of meadows along Little Timber Creek. In the Dartmouth College case,
Justice Story remarks, "1A grant of franchise is not, in point of
principle, distinguishable'from a grant of any other property. If,
therefore, this charter were a pure donation, when the grant was
complete and accepted by the grantees it involved a contract that
the grantees should hold, and the grantors should not reassume the
grant, as much-as if it had been founded on the most valuable consideration."
Under the provisions of the act of 1T60 rights have become
vested, and valuable property has been acquired. These powers
and this property have been enjoyed under the protection of this
act, for nearly a century past. The state has participated in the
benefits conferred. The property acquired under the act, has
been taxed for the support of the State and Municipal Governments. It is in violation of good faith, it impairs the obligation of
a contract which has been enjoyed to the mutual benefit of both
parties, and it is therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the

GLOVER AND OTHERS vs. POWELL AND OTHERS.

United States. It is in direct conflict with repeated judicial decisions declaring similar acts void. Pletehervs. Peek, 6 Cranch, 87;
State of .Vew Jersey vs. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Dartmouth
College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Terrett and others vs.
Taylor and others, 9 Cranch, 43 ; Story's Com. on the Constitution
of the United States, vol. iii. 256.
The act of 1854 is also repugnant to the Constitution of the
State of New Jersey. Art. 1, see. 16, declares, private property
shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, and
Art. 4, see. 7, p. 9, individuals or private corporations shall not
be authorized to take private property for public use, without
just compensation first made to the owners. The dam and water
works in question are private property. They have been constructed,
maintained, and paid for, by the owners of the meadow along the
creek. They have been acquired under the 'express sanction of
law. The value of the meadow is destroyed by the execution of
the law in question, and thus may be said with propriety to be taken
from thie owners. A partial destruction, or a diminution in its
value is the taking of private property. This act cannot be carried
into effect without a violation of the Constitution of the State.
But to avoid 1he force of these objections to the act, the defendants set up in their answer, that this dam is a nuisance; that the
conditions contained in the act, and upon which the rights and
privileges of the act are secured to the defendants have been violated,
and that therefore the Legislature have ordered and have a right to
authorize and direct the removal of the nuisance. But the defendants must justify themselves and can only justify themselves,
under the act. The act declares the object to be to restore the
navigation of the creek. The act can be executed for no other
purpose.
But suppose the conditions of the act to have been violated, and
that the grant has been forfeited, the forfeiture must be declared by
due process of law. The Legislature have no right to condemn the
defendants unheard, and depiive them of their property in this
summary way. If they can do it in this case, then may they
repeal every act of incorporation on the statute book upon the

